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ABSTRACT
Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism (SR) endorse also Modal Realism (MR), 
i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship be-
tween these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an 
indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, 
both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal 
commitments. 
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Realism about What? 




Scientific Realism (SR) and Modal Realism (MR) are both conceptually and historically re-
lated. It has been common to define SR as the belief that theories capture (at least approximately) 
the nomological structure of the world. But the link is also motivational. There is a realist attitude 
towards scientific theories that makes SRists more likely to accept modal commitments. Most 
philosophers accept both SR and MR in some of their variants, with only a few exceptions, as far 
as I know—Psillos and Papineau are for sure the most remarkable. Nonetheless, the true nature 
of the relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. 
SR states, mainly, that the unobservable entities posited by our best scientific theories exist. 
This ontological claim has epistemic and semantic counterparts, i.e., the claims that we have 
knowledge about those entities and that our statements about them have truth values—as op-
posed to instrumentalism. So SR comes in many flavors according to which of these claims you 
decide to commit to, and what kind of commitment you adopt about them. As the scope of this 
paper is standard SR, I will assume a full commitment at each of those three levels. 
On the other hand, modality, like almost everything in philosophy, can be said in many 
ways. However, it’s enough for the aims of this paper to define MR as the position which accepts 
that there is an objective counterpart that underpins the truth values of modal statements which 
are not logical truths—mainly of those that assign necessity/possibility to natural regularities or 
phenomena. In a nutshell, the statement “Necessarily, that all pieces of metal are pieces of metal” 
is true because “All pieces of metal are pieces of metal” is a logical truth, so the original statement is 
about logical necessity. On the other hand, consider the statement “Necessarily, all pieces of metal 
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expand when heated”. It is not about logical necessity because 
“All pieces of metal expand when heated” is not a logical truth. 
So what can we say about statements of this kind? For the 
modal anti-realist hey are simply false statements because—
as van Fraassen (1977) put it in his now classic essay—the 
only necessity is verbal necessity. Conversely, for MR those state-
ments can have modal features of the world (e.g., necessary 
connections in nature) as their truthmakers. Thus, according 
to MR the truth value of the aforementioned statement de-
pends on natural necessity. 
It is worth pointing out that MR is not just commit-
ted to objective modality, but to irreducible objective modality. 
There have been attempts to reduce modality to mere reg-
ularity (e.g., Psillos, 2014), claiming that constant conjunc-
tions (instead of necessary connections) are good enough as 
truthmakers for modal statements. There are many reasons 
to reject that non-modal view of modality. My own is that 
it collapses in some version of van Fraassen’s Constructive 
Empiricism, but as I’m not going to address that point in this 
work, I’ll restrict my conclusions to MR as committed to irre-
ducible objective modality. 
In this paper I aim to clarify the relation between SR 
and MR as one of indirect implication from the former to the 
latter. I hope to precisely elucidate that implication along the 
following pages, but for now this should suffice: although the 
basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argu-
ment for SR and the best realist theory of reference do im-
ply modal commitments. In the second section I’ll show the 
modal implications of the notion of explanation underlying 
the so-called No-Miracle Argument (NMA). In the third 
section I maintain that the most widely accepted theory of 
reference for SR, Causal Descriptivism, commits SRists who 
adopt it to also accept MR. Finally, the last section includes 
the conclusions and final comments to this work. 
Explanation and the 
No-Miracle Argument
A non-conclusive but still important point to be made is 
about what could be called a realist attitude towards modality, 
which is typical among SRists. Those who believe that things 
like atoms really exist—and that includes me—are more like-
ly to believe that some things happen to them necessarily. It 
is very common to maintain that scientific theories provide 
real knowledge only when they latch onto the modal struc-
ture of the world (e.g., Armstrong, 1985; Ladyman, 1998; 
Chakravartty, 2007). Another reason for positing this atti-
tude is the fact that scientific discourse is often full of modal 
notions. References to causal processes, objective probability, 
causal-based equilibrium and the mere enunciation of many 
scientific laws suggest that some modal commitments are 
immanent to scientific pra ice (see Berenstain and Ladyman, 
2012, p. 152). But despite all this, it should be noted that MR 
does not logically follow from SR. It’s a perfectly coherent po-
sition to assert that unobservable entities exist, while denying 
objective modality at the same time. As indicated above, that 
is in fact a position Psillos and Papineau endorse. 
However, I maintain that there is strong conceptual sup-
port for that realist attitude towards modality. It is not in the ba-
sis of SR itself, but in the arguments SRists use in favor of their 
position. If that’s the case, SRists who reject objective modality 
are in a weaker position to defend their realist commitments 
than the ones who endorse MR. I offer two examples of this. 
The first comes from the main argument for SR, the NMA. 
The second, which I’ll tackle in the third section, is related to 
the aim of finding an appropriate theory of reference for SR. 
Let’s then start with the first example. As is well known, 
the NMA is the most important argument usually brought 
forward in support of SR. Its seminal formulation is due to 
Putnam, for whom SR “is the only philosophy that doesn’t 
make the success of science a miracle” (1975, p. 73). The usual 
way in which this idea has been fleshed out regards this ar-
gument as an instance of Inference to the Best Explanation 
(IBE): the (approximate) truth of our theories is the best ex-
planation of the predictive success of science. 
The NMA has been discussed in many works and has 
been reconstructed in various ways3, however, there is a no-
torious lacuna in the  ecialized literature concerning the 
notion of explanation underlying it. Even attending to discus-
sions around IBE itself, not much clues are given about how 
explanation should be understood when applied at a meta-sci-
entific level. I maintain that making some precisions about it 
can provide a base for the main point of this section, i.e., that 
the notion of explanation underlying the NMA has some 
modal implications that the realist must accept if she is using 
it in support of her position. But I believe the convenience of 
MR can be shown even if that were not the case. Let’s say 
I’m wrong about my first point and a version of NMA that 
gives up modality can actually be formulated. Even in that 
case, this non-modal version of NMA would leave the realist 
in a weaker rhetorical position against anti-realists, by taking 
away the most compelling a ects of the argument. 
Let’s review the strong point first. The NMA states, 
roughly  eaking, that the best explanation for the predictive 
success of science is the truth of our best theories. It is the 
best, but not the only explanation. The other alternative at 
hand is a miracle. Things are a lot more complicated than 
that, but what we need to stress here is that there is some par-
ticular notion of explanation in use. But which one could it 
be? Ruling out some possibilities can be a useful strategy. One 
cannot think of explanation without considering Hempel’s 
covering-law model. This could seem promising to modal an-
ti-realists given that Hempel’s model presupposes a Humean 
3 An interesting and rich overview can be found in Leader (2013). See Borge (2015) for a summary of some recent debates over the 
NMA.
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approach to the problem of natural regularity. But it’s easy to 
see why this couldn’t work. The NMA is formulated as a me-
ta-scientific explanation of our best theories’ predictive pow-
er. Making it fit into the covering-law model requires show-
ing that empirical success is a particular case of some kind of 
general law involving the truth of scientific theories. But there 
is no such thing as a meta-scientific law relating confirmation 
with truth4. And even if we could imagine something like that 
it would still remain an open question whether that law was 
genuine or a mere accidentally true generalization. 
Salmon’s (1971) statistical relevance model is also incon-
venient for this context. The reason why is extremely simple: 
explanations in terms of statistical relevance appeal to prior 
probabilities. In order to say that successful theories (S) are 
likely to be true (T) rather than false, you would have to 
know the prior probability of T within S: P(T|S) = p; that is, 
the prior probability of a theory being true if it belongs to the 
class of successful scientific theories. And of course that is not 
a piece of information we have. 
The causal mechanical model of explanation (Salmon, 
1984; Dowe, 2000) cannot be of any help either. This model 
is focused on the explanation of physical processes, and clearly 
the relation between truth and empirical success in not one 
of them. Also pragmatic theories of explanation such as van 
Fraassen’s (1980) will not work. Despite being flexible enough 
to accommodate to non-modal intuitions, they are the basis 
of many arguments undermining SR. If the price is to give up 
realism, it is obviously too high. 
Instead, the notion of metaphysical explanation seems 
to fit better with the task of explaining the consistent suc-
cessful predictions of mature scientific theories by claiming 
their truthfulness. At least in the context of the philosophy 
of science, metaphysical explanation can be tracked back to 
Duhem, for whom “[t]o explain (explicate, explicare) is to 
strip reality of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order 
to see the bare reality itself ” (1991 [1906], p. 7). So to explain 
is to be engaged in a metaphysical inference that is grounded 
in its ability to remove the veil of appearance. But besides the 
act of explaining there is a sense in which the explanation is out 
there to be found, it is independent from its epistemic realiza-
tion. That is coincident with Lewis’ approach to metaphysical 
explanation. According to Lewis, 
to explain an event is to provide some in-
formation about its causal history. […] An 
explanation […] is not an act of explaining. 
It is a chunk of explanatory information—in-
formation that may once, or often, or never, 
have been conveyed in an act of explaining 
(1986, p. 218).
This account is conceived for the explanation of singu-
lar events, but as Lewis himself makes clear (1986, p. 225), it 
could be easily extended to general kinds of events. So there 
is something like a piece of information that is capable of ex-
plaining the causal history of the empirical success of science, 
and according to NMA that is no other thing that the truth 
of scientific theories. But in this sense of metaphysical expla-
nation the outcome described in the explanandum is ground-
ed in the items conforming the explanans, so that without any 
of them what is described in the explanandum “would not 
have happened, or at least it would have been very much less 
probable than it was” (Lewis, 1986, p. 214). That is precisely 
the sense the NMA gives to the truth of our best scientific 
theories—if they weren’t true science wouldn’t have been as 
successful as it is, or at least its success would have been very 
much less probable, say, a miracle. The crucial point here is 
that none of this can be maintained without a modal account 
of counterfactuality. The truth and independence of the ex-
planation depends on the possibility of some counterfactual 
assumptions being true. And there is no way to do that with-
out modal commitments. Both Duhem’s and Lewis’ notions 
of metaphysical explanation show how some account of mo-
dality should be assumed in order to maintain that science 
wouldn’t have been as successful as it is if theories were not true 
or approximately true. 
Since Duhem and Lewis little has been said about meta-
physical explanation as an independent issue. However, the 
concept has been widely discussed in relation to the notion of 
grounding, one of the central and fastest growing topics in con-
temporary metaphysics. Grounding is taken to be a relation 
of metaphysical dependence, some kind of constitutive deter-
mination or “ontological ground” (Fine, 2012), often cashed 
out in terms of in-virtue-of relations between facts or truths 
about them. Despite its structural and logical properties are 
usually thought to be shared with those of explanation, the 
precise relation between grounding and metaphysical expla-
nation is a matter of controversy between unionist and sepa-
ratist5. For the former, grounding just is a kind of metaphysical 
explanation, for the latter grounding is the relation—perhaps 
the primitive relation—that makes possible the formulation of 
metaphysical explanations. Since we are just dealing with the 
modal implication of metaphysical explanation—and those 
of grounding, if friends of this notion are right—it does not 
matter for the present purposes who must win. The import-
ant question here is if the adoption of a grounding-related 
approach to metaphysical explanation implies a commitment 
to MR. Again it is (as almost everything is in the lands of 
grounding) a matter of discussion. Although this is not the 
place to argue for a positive answer, I will mention a simple 
4 Lakatos often referred to “an inductive principle which connects realist metaphysics with methodological appraisals, verisimilitude with 
corroboration, which reinterprets the rules of the ‘scientific game’ as a—conjectural—theory about the signs of the growth of knowl-
edge, that is, about the signs of growing verisimilitude of our scientific theories” (1978, p. 156). However, he never got to formulate it, 
and it is hard to see how such an inductive principle could be articulated as a meta-scientific law.
5 The terms of this distinction are due to Raven (2015, p. 326).
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point that strongly suggest there is a close relationship be-
tween grounding and modality. 
Grounding is universally recognized as a kind of onto-
logical dependence relation between facts. It is more than 
just that, since it involves an extra connection signified by 
‘in virtue of ’ or ‘because’, which can hold or not in a rela-
tion of ontological dependence. But just for being a kind of 
ontological dependence grounding seems to inevitably rest 
on modal notions. It is also assumed that there are different 
types of grounding, corresponding to different kinds of ne-
cessity: metaphysical, natural, and normative necessity (Fine, 
2012, p. 38), but in any case modality is part of the game. 
For that reason friends of grounding generally accept what 
Correia and Benjamin (2012, p. 20) call the principle of ‘Ne-
cessitarianism’: 
For all facts f, g, g’ , … , if f is grounded in 
g, g’, ... , then as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity, f obtains if g, g’, ... do.
Of course there is a road the modal anti-realist might 
take: to claim that the modality presupposed in Necessitar-
ianism is reducible to non-modal facts. I cannot fully argue 
here against that alternative, but let me give some remarks 
regarding that point. First, the very idea of positing and de-
scribing a substantive relation of metaphysical determina-
tion or ontological dependence between facts in terms of 
in-virtue-of relations seems to be (at least pragmatically) 
at odds with the motivation to embrace a Humean frame-
work. After all, the idea is to show how those events are 
strongly (necessarily!) connected, not just how they coex-
ists in a mosaic of non-related ontological units. Second, it 
may be said that those in-virtue-of relations between facts 
can be cashed out in terms of supervenience, which is hap-
pily assumed to be part of the Humean menu. But superve-
nience is precisely one of the relations that are taken to be 
grounding-based.  
But let’s leave those discussions behind and turn our 
attention to the second (weaker) point of this section. After 
all, some may think that there is some other notion of expla-
nation that fits better with the NMA. Or maybe that there 
is a non-modal way to deal with counterfactuality, or even 
with metaphysical explanation and grounding. But even if 
that were the case, there would still be reasons to endorse 
MR. Those reasons come from the debate around the sta-
tus of natural laws. As is well known, scientific  eech is full 
of modal statements—e ecially in the enunciation of laws 
and its implications. Claims like Nothing can travel fa er than 
light are very common in scientific theories. A natural way 
to think about them is as statements that have truthmak-
ers in some modal objective facts like necessary connections 
in nature or necessitation relation between properties. But 
for Regularism that’s an exaggerated answer—it’s enough 
to conceive the truthmakers of scientific laws as contingent 
sequences of regular events. As it has been emphasized by 
Swartz (1985), pushed to its limit, Regularism claims natu-
ral regularity is like a big cosmic coincidence. Regular events 
just happen to be the way they are. It is true that the main 
motivation for the NMA is to affirm the existence of some 
unobservable entities given the success of science. But that 
success has a lot to do with science’s capacity of anticipat-
ing future events, and if the regularity that allows successful 
predictions is relegated to the status of an unexplained fact, 
the realist commitment to unobservable entities seems to 
become too thin. After all, to say that natural regularity is 
a brute fact, a sort of major cosmic coincidence, is not far 
from the miraculous alternative the NMA is supposed to be 
ruling out. So a non-modal version of the NMA turns to be 
a very weak one. 
Realism, reference and modality
It is widely recognized that both purely descriptivist 
and purely causal theories of reference are insufficient to 
account for the reference of theoretical terms within the 
framework of SR (see for example Nola, 1980; Lewis, 1984; 
Psillos, 2012). In short, the reasons go like this: The refer-
ence of a theoretical term cannot be fixed ostensibly, simply 
because there is nothing observable to point at. Positing a 
theoretical entity requires providing a description of which 
are its properties and of the functional role it is supposed 
to play. That description will include some indication of 
how the posited entity causes some observable phenomena. 
According to pure descriptivist theories of reference, chang-
es in the theoretical descriptions associated to a term lead 
to changes of reference. Given that theory change usually 
implies significant changes in the associated descriptions of 
theoretical terms, descriptivism must admit also changes of 
reference, even in cases when according to SR this is not 
supposed to happen. Take for example the term ‘atom’. The 
realist believes it refers to the same entities described by 
Dalton and by contemporary scientists—the only differ-
ence is that Dalton had some things wrong about the same 
entities. But that is not possible under pure descriptivist 
theories. They are too restrictive. So why not moving to 
causal ones? They have the advantage of not making ref-
erence stability depend on descriptions, so after all Dalton 
and Bohr could have been  eaking about the same thing. 
But, according to causal theories, given that reference-fix-
ing is mediated by some observable phenomena, the ref-
erence of a term is whatever is causing the phenomena. So 
‘phlogiston’ ends up referring to oxygen. Therefore, causal 
theories turn out to be too loose, to the point of making 
referential success trivial. The most usual way out of this 
problem is a hybrid theory called Causal Descriptivism 
(CD) (defended among others by Enć, 1976; Lewis, 1984; 
Kroon, 1987; Psillos, 2012). According to CD, the reference 
of a theoretical term is fixed by a mixed mechanism: 
R(x) = x causes phenomena Φ and D(x).
Term t refers to x if and only if R(x).
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The descriptivist component is given by D(x), while 
the causal one is given by ┌x causes Φ┐. The central idea 
is that CD can capture two reasonable intuitions: that de-
scriptions are essential to reference-fixing in the case of 
theoretical terms, and that the causal relation between the 
posited entity and the user of the new term is relevant to 
guarantee (non-trivial) referential stability. There are a lot 
of issues with CD—actually I have my own objections to 
it (see Borge, forthcoming)—but it is without doubt the 
most accepted theory of reference within SR. This is not 
the place to go through all the details, but I just want to 
mention some a ects of CD that strongly suggest a com-
mitment to MR. (i) Reference transmission is causal and 
can be tracked back following causal chains; (ii) regular 
phenomena are caused by some unobservable entities in a 
way that can be captured by the causal component of CD, 
in virtue of some causal properties or powers, D(x); (iii) it 
is not just a matter of singular causation, therefore in ev-
ery circumstance in which Φ is observed, or even when it’s 
not actually observed, it should be taken as caused by x in 
the way described by D(x); (iv) x constitutes a new natural 
kind, commonly chara erized by some essential or kind con-
stitutive properties; (v) the causal element in reference-fix-
ing is frequently understood as a rigid designation, i.e., des-
ignation in every possible world; (vi) this is also fleshed out in 
terms of counterfactual facts that function as truthmakers of 
modal statements about reference. 
This is of course not conclusive, since a modal anti-re-
alist who wants to keep herself a SRist can look for an alter-
native to CD. However, she will have to deal with two diffi-
culties. First, she has to reject the main theory of reference 
within the framework of SR. Second (and more important-
ly), she must build an alternative theory that avoids not only 
modal commitments, but also the difficulties of both purely 
descriptivist and purely causal theories of reference.
Conclusion
It is not hard to show how what I called a realist attitude 
toward scientific theories makes it very likely that if you are 
a SRist, you also have a commitment to MR. It is something 
like a statistical fact among philosophers of science. In this pa-
per I attempted to expound some of the rational bases for that 
attitude. There may be other important reasons for it, but if 
I’m right those who advocate SR while rejecting MR are in a 
weaker position to defend SR from anti-realist threats. 
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